From Wilson to Kinnock: union rights sacrificed to profits
Socialist Viewpoint1980sTranscribed by hand from the printed page.
THE dominant feature of the class struggle in Britain in the 1980s is the repeated use of the law by the employers against the trade unions. The courts are used both in industrial disputes to ham-string the unions and inside the unions to prevent the advance of the left. Judges now make up the law as they go along in line with what they see as the political requirements of the day.
In front of this offensive the leaders of the official labour movement have collapsed. The NGA was betrayed at Warrington in what has been shown to have been an historic defeat of the trade union movement. The TUC allowed the NUM to stand alone in the face of the sequestration of the whole of its funds in the middle of a national strike. They allowed the right wing of the AUEW and the EETPU to flout the policy it established in 1982 by holding a Special Congress to officially abandon the policy itself.
The results of all this are clear in the Wapping dispute. High Court injunctions have all but rendered the picketing ineffective, whilst the unions see their role as complying with the law in order to "defend the unions".
In assessing the long term effects of this situation as we look to the possibility of a Labour Government next year it is important to look back on the role Labour has played in creating this disastrous situation.
In fact the strength of the trade unions and the shop floor movement have been a major political issue of every Government — whether Labour or Tory since the war. The Attlee Government retained war time compulsory arbitration and introduced an incomes policy. The Macmillan Government introduced a "pay pause" in 1961 under Selwyn Lloyd and made tentative moves towards industrial legislation.
It was, however, with the Labour Government of 1964–70 that the issue of trade union power became an overriding obsession. That Government, even more than the Tory Government of Edward Heath, was the forerunner of Thatcher's policy in bringing the courts directly into the trade union movement in Britain.
Barbara Castle published the White Paper — In Place of Strife — the Wilson Government's proposals for industrial legislation, in January 1969. The main provision was the establishment of a new "Industrial Board" — a type of industrial court — with powers to order strikers back to work for a 28 day "cooling off", or order a secret ballot.
She argued against automatic compulsory strike ballots on the basis that this would make the situation worse at times when the membership was more militant then the leadership, and that there should therefore be discretion as to when a ballot should be used. In order to argue that her measures would not involve trade unionists going to prison, Castle proposed that fines on individuals should be recovered by direct deduction from the wages of those concerned!
The public attitude of the TUC and the leaders of the main unions was one of complete hostility to the measues, but behind the scenes, it was a very different story. TUC General Secretary, Vic Feather, strongly supported the measures, and people like AUEW leader Hugh Scanlon, the "left" in the TUC, were saying one thing in public and another in private to Castle herself.
All this meant that despite the great public outcry and the breakdown of the relationship between the TUC and the Labour Government the physical opposition to In Place of Strife was organised by the unofficial movement. There was a series of successful one day actions, initiated by the Communist Party and the Trotskyists of the Socialist Labour League (although these organisations differed over wider action), which were all opposed by the official movement.
In Place of Strife was eventually withdrawn by Wilson in favour of a pledge by the TUC, at a Special Congress, that individual unions would use their own rule books to discipline members who stepped out of line by taking unofficial strike action. It was a defeat for Wilson, but it did prepare the ground for the victimisation of militants at a later stage.
A year later, the Tory Government of Edward Heath took up the baton where Wilson had dropped it with the Industrial Relations Act. This established an industrial court — the National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) with wide powers to order strikers back to work, order secret ballots and impose fines and financial sanctions on unions.
Although this legislation was adopted by Parliament in 1971 it faced ferocious opposition and created the most militant period in British post war labour history. The official movement was forced into opposition to the Act. The authority of the NIRC was effectively broken in the summer of 1972, after escalating unofficial strikes and the threat of a one day general strike secured the release of five jailed Pentonville dockers by the intervention of the celebrated "Official Solicitor". Heath was brought down by the miners in February 1974 and replaced by a new Labour administration.
In sharp contrast with the problems we face today, the 1974 Labour Government had no alternative than to repeal the Industrial Relations Act soon after the election, which pushed the AUEW to the brink of national strike action aainst the threat of sequestration. It was repealed within a year and replaced with a series of measures including the establishment of Industrial Tribunals.
This did not mean, however, that the Wilson/Callaghan Government stopped attacking the working class. The attack came through wage control, productivity drives, higher levels of unemployment, factory closures and the introduction of class-collaborationist "worker participation" schemes designed to compromise the independence of the shop stewards movement which had grown rapidly over the previous 15 years.
These policies brought Labour back into full-scale confrontation with the working class. In 1978 a 5% wage limit was introduced under conditions of 20% inflation. The authority of the Callaghan Government was eventually broken whilst it was trying to impose the 5% "norm" on low paid workers in the so-called "dirty jobs" strike in the winter of 1978–79.
Where the Thatcher Government of 1979 differed from previous Labour and Tory Governments was not in its general strategic objecive, but in its greater determination to achieve it. It came to power with a detailed plan designed to take on and defeat the trade union movmeent, introduce a new package of anti-union laws and create mass unemployment over a period of 5 or 6 years as the basis on which to increase the rate of exploitation of the working class, and thus restore profitability in British industry.
To this end Thatcher provoked a series of well chosen confrontations with sections of the trade union movement. In early 1980 she took on and defeated the steel workers over jobs — 90,000 jobs were directly lost as a result. In 1981 she took on and defeated the rail unions over wages and working practices. In 1982 she took on and defeated workers in the civil service and the NHS. At the same time a series of confrontations with BL workers in 1979, 1980 and 1981 broke the shop stewards movement and a 90,000 were lost as a result in that industry.
It was not that the Thatcher Government possessed an inherent strength which none of the other post war Governments had had, or that the rank and file of the trade union movement was less willing to take on a struggle than they had been in the 1960s or the 1970s — the steel workers strike could not have shown that more clearly. Nor was it the effect of mass unemployment, which had initially been created by the Labour government. It stood at 1 million when the Tories were elected and grew at almost a million a year over the next three years.
The overwhelming factor in the success of the Tories was the attitude of the trade union leaders. Their reaction to the raw determination of the Thatcherites to address the fundamental needs of the capitalist system and the escalating unemployment figures and the economic problems of British capitalism was to decide that it was necessary to compromise.
Thus each of the strike confrontations of the 1980–83 period saw a new determination from the trade union tops. Most of those struggles were actively broken, rather than simply betrayed, by the union leaders. In BL the behind-the-scenes deal rached with Labour — to stop strikes and make the Company profitable — continued under Thatcher. Each strike was destroyed by the intervention of one union leader or another. In the NHS the union leaders refused to break from their disastrous selective strike policy despite widespread support for all out action, and backing from the rank and file of other unions.
The determination of the TUC to stop struggles against the Tory Government could be seen in the isolated cases where the leadership of a union was prepared to make a stand, as in the case of ASLEF who made a firm stand over "flexible rostering". ASLEF was a powerful union, capable of defending their jobs and conditions. They were clearly picked out by the Tories to be defeated on the issue of working practices. But they were not defeated by the Tories: they were broken by the active intervention of the TUC! This was carried out in the most cold-blooded and brutal way. After the BR Board threatened to sack the entire ASLEF membership, they were actually instructed back to work by the F&GP of the General Council and threatened with expulsion from the TUC unless they ended their action and returned to work on the employers' terms!
Nor was the record of the TUC any better on the issue of the Anti-union laws. In 1980 the Tories introduced their first package of laws. Their approach differed from Heath in that they did not attempt to set up an industrial court, but legislated for action by the regular courts. This first tentative package limited the number of pickets to six and attacked the closed shop by providing for huge sums of money as retrospective compensation for those who lost their jobs as a result of refusing to join a union.
The second package in 1982 was much more serious. It removed the union's immunities at law in respect of action for damages from strikes — an immunity which the trade unions had established at the turn of the century. In future political strikes would be declared illegal; workers would only be able to picket their "own" workplace; and other picketing would be regarded as "secondary action". These provisions could be enforced by the employers, or others, through the regular courts by means of an injunction. The third package in 1984 made secret ballots a legal requirement before any form of industrial action could be taken.
Taken together these three packages represent by far the most restrictive legislation enacted against the trade union movmenet in this country this century and was bound to bring about a very substantial shift of advantage towards the employers and the Government.
Despite this the reaction of the official movement to the legislation from the outset was, in reality, one of the tacit acceptance of it as an inevitability and looking towards a future Labour Government possibly to repeal it. They did of course denounce the new laws, but even at that level their reaction was very different to 1980. There were no rallies, no demonstrations, nothing to warn the movement of the seriousness of what was happening. Nor was their reaction any surprise. In 1970 many of the unions had been supporting official action against the Heath Government over wages and other isues; by 1980 the order of the day was to stop all strikes taking place. To have promoted a serious campaign against the Prior and Tebbit legislation would have flown in the face of that.
In any case they were selling out so many struggles and strengthening the employers and the Government by giving them so many victories that the union leaders quickly got into a position where action on the laws would have been hard to get.
In April 1982 the TUC called a conference of executives to determine the policy of the movement on the issue of the anti-union laws. At that conference they were not prepared to initiate a campaign against the legislation or begin any form of action against the laws.
The policy they adopted was to wait until the laws were used; then would be the time to take action. Until then, they would build up a "fighting fund" to support that fight when it came.
Within the terms of this approach, however, what they adopted was, on paper at least, quite a hard line policy. It was decided that in the event of any union finding itself under attack from the laws they could come to the TUC and they would receive the full support of the movement including strike action even if that strike action was illegal! This point was spelled out strongly by Len Murray.
Thatcher, however, was in no hurry to use the laws. She wanted to get all three packages legislated and she wanted to make sure that when the laws were used they would be successfully used!
The key confrontation came a year and a half later, in November 1983, at Warrington. Newspaper publisher Eddie Shah, obtained a High Court injunction under the 1982 legislation requiring the NGA to remove the picket they had placed on his plant. The NGA refused, and were fined £150,000 for contempt of court. Fleet Street struck for two days in solidarity and the newspaper employers filed claims for £3m in damages for lost production against the NGA.
After a picket of 5,000 was smashed by riot police, the NGA was fined a further £375,000 and the whole of its assets were sequestrated. In response, the NGA named the day for a national one-day strike of their membership and called on the TUC for support under the terms of the April 1982 policy decisions.
The response of the General Council triggered an historic defeat for the trade union movement from which we would suffer for a long period of time. Instead of giving the support pledged in 1982, they denounced the proposed action and told the NGA to work normally and comply with the law!
That betrayal stands behind all the attacks which have taken place on the trade union movement since. The TUC betrayal became known as the "new realism". It meant the systematic collapse of all trade union opposition to the employers and the Government, and the surrendering of everything which had been won in previous decades.
During this time the Tories had pressed their advantage on the shop floor. The shop stewads movement developed in the 1960s and the 1970s was under constant attack by management, strengthened directly by government. Working conditions established over several decades were being destroyed and massive speed-up taking place at the point of production.
Even at this late stage this situation could still have been reversed. Although the defeats were being imposed on the big organised sectors of the working class they had not created a situation where the working class were not prepared to take action. At the same time the most powerful union — the NUM — had not yet been brought into the battle. In a careful tactical game, the Tories had made concessions to the NUM on both wages and jobs in order to avoid provoking a confrontation with them until they were ready.
When the confrontation with the miners came, the rank and file of the NUM responded, and the national leadership of the NUM rose to the challenge, fighting the battle for the first time on the basis of the principle of jobs and rejecting the Government's profitability argument. It was a strike which could and should have been won. The national leadership stood firm and the rank and file mounted an historic struggle for a whole year against everything which the NCB and the state could throw against them.
Winning the strike raised the political question of an adequate strategic approach to its central problem — the isolation of the NUM. If the miners remained isolated they would eventually be defeated. Breaking the isolation meant essentially breaking the grip of the dead hand of the TUC which had betrayed the NGA at Warrington and was now more determined than ever that there would be no generalised industrial action against the Government.
Despite his strength it was a political problem which Scargill could not resolve. His politics were left Labour and he was essentially a left, even if very left, segment of the trade union bureaucracy. He failed to confront the TUC leaders in their attitude to the strike or their failure even to mention the sequestration of the South Wales NUM in August 1984 — let alone implement the 1982 policy. Instead he did a behind the scenes deal with TUC General Secretary Len Murray, which effectively perpetuated the isolation of the miners (from strike support) and made the strike extremely difficult to win without a reversal of the decisions of the 1984 TUC Congress. When the NUM had the whole of its funds seized and a government official was put in to control the union's financial affairs, there was not a murmur from other trade union leaderships.
At the same time Scargil failed to challenge the role of the Communist Party and the influence it had on the strike. From being opposed to the mass picketing, the CP moved to favour a ballot and initiated the moves for a return to work through the South Wales Area.
The defeat of the miners wwas another historic defeat for the tade union movement. It not only put the Government in a powerful position, but it triggered a further shift to the right in the trade unions, immeasurably strengthened Kinnockism in the Labour Party, and opened the door to a new witch-hunt of the left.
The most sinister development in the trade unions, however, has been the activities of the EETPU, which have for some time represented the development of US-type business unionism, joining with the employers to break other independent trade unions. For some time the EETPU have been signing single union agreements — often over the heads of existing trade unions — based on sweetheart clauses and no strike provisions.
It was the EETPU with the AUEW which challenged the TUC on the only point of opposition to the anti-union laws which they were still sticking to — the acceptance of Government money for strike ballots. The refusal of the TUC to expel these two unions for their flagrant breach of Congress policy was a major victory for the right wing and strengthened the kind of business unionism which EETPU leader Hammond represents. They were able to make links with the UDM and work with unions like the AUEW who have already gone a long way in the same direction.
At the same time a serious slide to the right was taking place right across the trade union movement. The swing of the T&G behind Kinnock and Ron Todd's acceptance of an incomes policy under a future Labour Government against the policy of the union, the election of Bill Jordan to the leadership of the AEU and the evolution of NUPE from a left wing union to a leading witch-hunter of the left are all examples of the rightward move.
A symptom of these changes and particularly the development with the EETPU was the print dispute over Wapping. In January 1985 Rupert Murdoch announced the imposition of new working conditions on the News International workforce. Many of the proposals were taken straight out of some of the agreements negotiated by the EETPU: no-strike clauses; no negotiations at local level; no closed shop; complete flexibility; no job security; management's exclusive right to manage; and legally binding contracts. Fleet Street, probably the best organised section of the trade union movement, with a history of principled support for other sections of workers, was being taken on in a struggle which would challenge the very existence of union organisation in national newspapers in Britain.
On January 24 the News International workforce struck against the imposed conditions they were promptly sacked. Within 24 hours Murdoch had moved his production to Wapping and was running his presses with the EETPU electricians who had installed the machinery, plus others specially recruited through the EETPU Southampton office. Four national newspapers were now being produced without the involvement of the print unions.
Again the TUC refused to act. The EETPU was "called to account" and then asked to accept a number of conditions relating to Wapping which were carefully couched in terms they could accept. They were not required to withdraw their members from Wapping or to instruct them to stop crossing the picket lines of the print unions. Hammond accepted the conditions — and nothing changed. Soon after that the General Council called an emergency Congress.
As with the miners' strike, the Wapping dispute has faced problems of leadership, but they have been of a very different order. The leadership of the print unions — even the NGA — were right wing and were pushed into the strike because of the harshness of management action. From the start both union leaderships — particularly SOGAT — have been trying to get out of the situation.
The strike has rested on two central issues; the ability to spread the strike to Fleet Street — which in turn involved the second — a willingness to defy the courts (the decision of SOGAT, after sequestration of its asets, to purge its "contempt" and comply with the law was a disaste for the strike, making it impossible to spread the fight without changing that policy).
Nor have the problems of leadership been simply at national level within the print unions. The organisation at chapel level has been the driving force of the strike. They are the ones who have maintained the remarkable levels of organisation and involvement in picketing which have continued throughout. The chapel leaderships were responsible for the remarkable vote rejecting Murdoch's offer of the Gray's Inn Road building plus redundancy money. Yet these same militants — strongly influenced by the Morning Star have not been equipped to tackle the political problems of the strike. The national leadership won the argument on the strategy of the strike early on and that has never been challenged from the chapels. Apart from a minority of militants they have always rejected the fight to bring out Fleet Street.
As with the miners' strike, the Communist Party has been a dangerous conservative factor at every stage, opposed to any serious challenge to Dean and Dubbins. At the SOGAT Conference they persuaded the chapel delegations to withdraw motions calling for a policy of defying the courts — in return for a resolution of general support. As a result of this, Brenda Dean was able to get unanimous votes to back a policy of not defying the law and putting full control of the strike in the hands of the National Executive. On top of this the CP has had a dozen of its own members crossing the picket lines at Wapping and going into work.
The series of defeats and setbacks suffered by the trade union movement in the last six years poses a number of political questions which cannot be answered simply by listing the record of betrayal of the top leaders. Why was the shop stewards movement which developed so powerfully over the previous two decades unable to counter those betrayals more effectively? Why were they not able to point to a class struggle road independent of the top officials? Clearly they were not politically equipped to do so; the stewards movement has played a much more militant role than the officials throughout that period, but was not politically distinct from the official movement. Layers of branch officials and shop stewards were all the time pulled back into the official movement.
These questions cannot be adequately answered without looking at the role of the Trotskyist movement over the past 30 years. With each of the major Trotskyist currents over that period the problem has been achieving a consistent orientation to trade union work. If there was a lack of political development in the shop stewards movement none of those currents were in a position to make a significant contribution to resolving it. The most important contribution was made by the Socialist Labour League in the 1950s and 1960s. Important trade union militants were won from the CP after 1956 like Brian Behan and bases were built in the Liverpool docks and on some of the building sites in London. In the 1960s a large base was built in the Cowley car plants and large number of workers recruited from a range of industries. The Oxford Liaison Committee and after it the All Trades Union Alliance were originally significant rank and file groupings with some influence in sections of industry. Workers were recruited to the SLL on a political basis, but the profound crisis of that movement, politically advanced even at that time, was to strangle the healthy side and turn trade union work increasingly towards the sectarian project of "build the mass revolutionary party".
As the SLL politically declined, the IS (SWP) grew. They recruited in the trade unions but based their work on "rank and file" conceptions which could not challenge the syndicalism which held back the movement, or tackle the matters of breaking the grip of the conservative top leaders of the movement.
The IMG came out of the student movement after 1968, based on conceptions of student power, and never came to terms with serious work in the trade unions.
When it came to the major strikes of the past three years the problems of this legacy remained unresolved. Yet the miners' strike, and to a lesser extent the Wapping strike, represented a unique opportunity for an effective intervention by Trotskyists. The miners' strike could not have been more open. Both have been long strikes, with major political problems to be resolved if they were going to be won (these problems are still unresolved in the print strike). Both have had support movements in which the far left had, in the case of the print strike still has, full access.
The record of the various tendencies in the course of these strikes has been no better than the historical record would suggest. The SWP in the miners' strike, for example, were still trapped in crass rank and fileism. In typical syndicalist fashion they saw the road to victory through more picketing. They opposed confronting the TUC and opposed the call for a general strike at every stage of the strike and, like Scargill, saw Saltley gate of 1972 as the model which would bring victory. It is true that picketing was very important: but the reality was it could not of itself win the strike. They had a sectarian attitude to the support groups because they did not see them at first as the best place to recruit to the SWP; they only became involved with them after the first seven months of the strike, when it became impossible to remain outside.
In the print dispute the SWP did recognise the key importance of bringing out Fleet Street — but has generally linked it only with the need for bigger pickets at Wapping. They have generally kept out of the print support groups.
In the miners' strike the WRP was still caught in the horrors of the Healy period and were consequently reduced to endless calls for a general strike irrespective of its relevance at a particular time. They were pulled out of the support groups after some initial work in them. They have not reorgnised sufficiently after the expulsion of Healy to make an effective intervention into the print strike.
Militant operated in their normal sectarian way in both the miners' strike and the Wapping dispute, keeping out of the support groups unless it suited them in a particular area. They were a long way to the right of Scargill in the miners' strike. It turns out they had been in favour of a ballot throughout but had decided not to make this public until after the strike, arguing that to state their position at that time would have been "divisive"! They were therefore dishonest as well as wrong on the issue. Their leading members in the strike — Ian Isaac — voted for the return to work at the crucial South Wales delegate conference which authorised the South Wales Area leadership to fight for an end to the strike.
The Socialist League (formerly IMG) were the most crass tailenders of the Scargill leadership, arguing that to criticise Arthur Scargill was to "cross class lines" — though there was an internal division on this which emerged as the split with the "International" Group. The SL in the post strike situation are even worse. They have played little role in the print dispute, but in the Justice for Mineworkers Campaign they have joined up with bureaucrats and Stalinists and used Stalinist methods aganist others on the far left in order to gain positions for themselves.
Workers' Power recognised the problem of the isolation of the miners' strike and advocated a general strike at key times, but their means of achieving it were bizarre. Their own SWP past made them shrink from demanding that the TUC call it; they called instead for Scargill to call a general strike directly to the rank and file of the other unions, over the heads of the leaderships of those unions and over the heads of the TUC! In the print dispute Workers Power have done some useful work but have made a fetish of the development of a rank and file movement of print workers, and divded the Union of Print Support Groups by proposing that the support groups try to organise a rank and file movement inside the print unions.
The RCP were in favour of a national ballot of miners from the outset of the miners' strike; at the end of the strike they were calling for an end to the check-off system as an immediate high-priority demand for the NUM! Socialist Organiser have tail-ended Scargill and yet also opposed the expulsion of the EETPU from the TUC over their scabbing at Wapping.
The clearest example of the ineffectiveness of the far left in the miners' strike was the role they played in the conference organised by the Mineworkers' Defence Committee in December 1984. The Committee was comprised of a coalition of the main far left groups and the conference was held at the time of the sequestration of the NUM. Yet by a majority decision, the groups concerned voted to exclude all resolutions on the strategy of the strike, the anti-union laws, the issue of a general strike or the spreading of the strike to other industries. All such resolutions were ruled out of order — not by the right wing, but by the far left. A huge and representative conference was denied a view on the course of the strike. All that was allowed was "solidarity with the miners". The anti-union laws were not even mentioned in the entire day.
Meanwhile, in complete contrast, in the real world, the NUM Executive was meeting in emergency session to consider the implications of the sequestration. They voted under Scagill's leadership to call on the TUC to organise strike action in their support. It was a call for a general strike in all but name. (It became defused because it was left to Eurocommunist Mick McGahey to take it to the TUC). The miners delegates were way out in front of the "far left" at that point. This does not make Scargill a Marxist; rather the far left were once again irrelevant to the situation at one of the most crucial points of the strike.
This raises the question as to what is the role of Marxists in industrial struggles. Is it simply to be the best builders of solidarity? Or is it to give political leadership to workers and seek to take the struggle beyond where militant left leadership is able to take them?
Do Marxist organisations not have an obligation to equip themselves with the lessons of such struggles in order that they can effectively carry out that role? Do they have to train themselves to intervene effectively, or do they have to train themselves to be the best cheer-leaders of the workers and their existing leaders?
It is not surprising that these issues, as they related to the miners' strike, have already been major factors in the splits which have taken place in the Trotskyist movement since then. They were a factor in the moves within the WRP which led to the expulsion of Healy, and they were a part of the political platform of the "International" Group which split from the SL.
These developments have posed the possibility of an important recomposition of the Trotskyist movement in this country. But such a recomposition must be based on a new approach to trade union work which breaks from the mistakes of the past, and recogises that work in the trade unions cannot be based on short term switches of orientation, but looks instead towards some long term consistent work in the unions.
There are large areas of the trade union movement where the far left show little interest until a dispute takes place, and the most of the groups move in to make propaganda and move out again as soon as they judge that there is nothing to be gained for themselves.
This can be seen in the public sector manual unions, where no section of the far left does any consistent work. There is little interest in the 1.25 million NHS workforce, 75% of which are women and a large percentage black. Yet they are a section of workers with an important record of militancy. The far left is hardly active on the huge issues of privatistion and cuts in the health service which have decimated jobs and wages in that industry. This attitude has given a free hand to the leaders of unions like COHSE, GMBATU and NUPE, and facilitated the shift to the right.
Similar points apply to other sectors including the 1 million local government manual workers. The far left has nothing to say about the basic issues of unionisation of the hotel, catering, and retail industries, where such a vast proportion of low paid youth and women workers suffer the extremes of exploitation, plus racist and sexist oppression. Yet it is only by seriously relating to the fight to organise, mobilise and improve the conditions of such basic sections of ordinary workers that Marxists can really build a foothold in the working class.
It has to be recognised that trade union work invovles demands and pressures greater than other areas of political work. In the unions it is not only a matter of arguing a point of view but of fighting an employer at the same time. There is the constant question of victimisation, and problems of maintaining suppport under the pressure of the employer and the media. Militants have to face witch-hunts and moves by the employers to isolate them at the key moments. These pressures, under which so mny capitulate, need to be seriously addressed and the necessary political back-up provided.
Through having this basic approach to work in the unions we would be better equipped to take up the general political problems which dominate the trade union movement.