The miners must break the isolation
Socialist Viewpoint1980sTranscribed by hand from the printed page.
[Headline: Miners must break the isolation! Second deck: Sequestration met by TUC silence.]
THE complete lack of response from a single trade union to the High Court decision to seize the national assets of the NUM will go down as a very black day for the British trade union movement. Neither the TUC nor a single trade union leader as much as made a public call for support for the NUM, or even spoke of the seriousness of the action. Yet this move against the NUM could seriously affect the course of a strike, the outcome of which could shape the conditions faced by the trade union and labour movement in Britain for a long time to come.
Moreover, if this sequestration is not challenged it will quickly lead to the full-blooded use of all the anti-union laws the Tory Government have been assembling: ballots on strikes, on the closed shop, and Labour Party affiliation.
The High Court action comes at a very difficult time for the striking miners, particularly with the failure of the TUC policy on the non-handling of substitute fuels in the power stations.
As far as can be seen, there is not a single power station where production is affected by the operation of TUC policy, which specifically bans the use of substitute fuel or fuel brought in by abnormal means. There are some power stations where votes have been taken not to handle scab coal, but they have yet to be challenged by management.
Where management have challenged, mostly on the use of substitute oil, the opposition to it has not held.
In fact, substitute fuel is being used in vast quantities throughout the power stations. Many non-coal fired stations are producing at much higher levels than before the strike. Power station workers are being offered blood money in the form of unlimited overtime to keep these levels of production up. Many of the drivers taking scab fuel through are T&G members from big companies with trade union organisation.
The situation has some parallels with the steel industry where some plants are breaking all previous production records.
The NACODS strike threat appeared to cut across this process and create new conditions for the strike with the prospects of shutting down the vital Nottinghamshire coalfield.
The Tories were panicked by the NACODS move and brought in Michael Eaton (remember him?) as a cosmetic exercise to placate the NACODS leadership after McGregor's attitude inflamed the situation (and to deal with the new conditions if NACODS did go on strike. In reality, however, the NACODS moves were never more than an exercise in brinkmanship, and the near inevitable calling off of the strike has put the Tory Government right back on course.
It has become apparent now how important the failure of the two dock strikes were to government strategy in combatting the strike.
The reality is that without any fresh factors in the situation the government have the ability to maintain power supply well into the winter providing they are prepared to see coal stocks drop at some stations to levels which are not normally acceptable.
A huge operation is now in progress to bring coal from all over the world and there is little doubt they can do it. Coal from Australia, South Africa, America, Vietnam and Poland is being taken in bulk carriers to continental ports and then fed into Britain in small ships through numerous small ports on the East coast which are having a bonanza. Lorries laid up in their thousands by the recession are back into commission to try to break the strike. Although the amounts coming in are not massive at the moment, they are likely to increase rapidly as the temperature drops and demand builds up.
The ability to maintain power supply, however, does not resolve the problem for the Government since the economic consequences of the strike are disastrous. The strike has directly cost over £4 bn; the pound has dropped in value and the balance of trade is deeply in the red.
The continuation of the strike is therefore unacceptable to the Tories even if they can stave off the effects on power supply. This is why they want a quick kill by the use of the courts.
Important as it is, however, the effect on the economy is not decisive. The highest principle of all for the Thatcher Government is defeating the miners and to do that they are prepared to wreck their economy, if that is unavoidable.
The strategic problems of the strike
The undeclared strategy of the NUM leadership has been to maintain the unity of the miners and conduct a war of attrition against the government and the NCB. They have based this on the belief that, despite the scabbing of Nottinghamshire, if the miners held firm, eventually power supplies would be hit and industry would begin to close and the miners would be in a position to win.
If that policy was ever viable, the situation in the pits and the power stations and the escalating use of the courts now calls it very seriously into question.
The war of attrition policy dictated in turn the policy of the NUM towards the TUC. If the miners could win on their own, then it was necessary only to neutralise the TUC — not to fight for them to take action. Equally, if the miners could win on their own then breaking the isolation into which the strike had drifted became something which was very desirable — but not absolutely essential for a miners' victory. If the miners could win on their own, then it was not worth taking any risks in fighting for TUC or broader support.
This led to the very low key response of the NUM to the sequestration of the South Wales Area (they never even called a national demonstration over it, for example). It led to the compromise on the eve of the TUC Conference; it led to NUM agreement to the withdrawal of the TGWU resolution at the Labour Party Conference endorsing the refusal of the NUM to go into the High Court, which would have broadened the issue out.
(This attitude was not always the case. In the early days of the strike, Arthur Scargill regularly broke the usual protocol and put other union leaders on the spot, often in front of mass rallies. It helped at the time to pressure some of the more left unions into doing something.)
Recently this attitude has led to an even more dangerous mistake. This was the failure of the NUM leaders to use the month's notice they had of the seizure of their assets to campaign for strike action on the day of the sequestration.
Speech after speech made no mention of it. The lead article of the edition of The Miner which was out soon after the High Court ultimatum even played down the issue of sequestration: if the article was to be taken seriously it let every other Trade Union leader off the hook.
The compromise at the TUC Conference did not simply result in no physical support for the miners from the TUC. Its political implications were equally important. By allowing the right wing to establish control of the conference they allowed them to push the conference to the right. That shift to the right established the political conditions which the strike would face, in relation to the rest of the trade union movement, in the period after the Conference. The advantage was put into the hands of the right wing, and they would use it to the full.
At the same time the TUC Conference resolution on the anti-union laws let the General Council completely off the hook for their betrayal of the NGA and did nothing to prepare for the present situation. In fact it re-established General Council discretion on whether or not to support a union under attack by the anti-union laws. It created the worst possible conditions for action when the NUM funds were eventually seized.
We argued that the NUM should have fought at the Conference for what was necessary to win the strike, which would have been for a general strike decision.
We are still convinced of that. Had they done so they would probably have been unsuccessful in getting a general strike as such, but it could have resulted in two things:
— it would probably have brought more limited action, but at least some action;
— more importantly, the fight of the NUM would have tended to push the Conference to the left, and established better conditions for the strike in the post-Conference period.
The NUM leadership appear to have feared that if they confronted the right-wing they could have been voted down on the strike as such. But it is not as simple as that. The consequences of a defeat of the miners for the labour movement as a whole are so obvious and far-reaching that it is very difficult for even the right wing — with maverick exceptions — to vote against it, and be held historically responsible. Most Trade Union leaders are embarrassed by the miners' strike and would like to see it over, but they don't want to see it defeated. Even if specific action — like a General Strike — had been voted down, a general resolution of support was almost inevitable.
A change of strategy for the NUM
The strength of the strike remains the tremendous determination, tenacity, solidarity and sacrifice of the rank and file miners. The present period, however, is difficult. The recent "back to work movement" promoted around the £1,400 Xmas bonus bribe being offered to striking miners is more significant than the previous complete flops. The bribery is an important factor; but so are the objective conditions now facing the strike. Rank and file miners now realise the extent of the isolation the strike faces. They see the emptiness of the TUC and Labour Party resolutions and — even more — they see no action at the point where their union's funds are seized. The decision of NACODS to strike (empty as that decision was) posed the possiblity of breaking the isolation; but calling off the strike strengthened the government and emphasised the isolation of the strike.
The NUM leadership remains determined, and are making no concessions to the NCB. But they need to rise to the new situation. Last week's one-day delegate conference resolved very little; the problems were brought out, but there were no new initiatives on offer, apart from a round of mass rallies — which are important but cannot be decisive (although Neil Kinnock disgracefully undermined this by refusing to speak).
The strategy remained a war of attrition under conditions where it is an even more problematic tactic now.
Fighting for a change of course
That situation, however, does contain within it a problem in fighting for a change in strategy, since the vast majority of active striking miners have confidence in the leadership, and don't, by and large, question the situation very much. A contrast with the steel strike is interesting. There, the biggest job of the strikers was stopping Bill Sirs selling them out. They therefore discussed continuously every aspect of the strategy of the strike, and were very knowledgeable about it. In this strike, the activists throw themselves into fighting the scabs and the police and the NCB.
One way or another, however, the strategy has to be discussed in the open. The war of attrition policy has to be abandoned. The problem of the isolation of the strike has to be recognised for what it is: the major strategic problem in winning a victory over the NCB and the government. Real steps have to be taken to break the isolation.
The seizure of the national assets of the union cannot be allowed to pass by like the South Wales example. The compromise with the TUC right wing has to be ended. The NUM must once again begin to demand action from the rest of the movement, and put the screws on the TUC. Given the composition of the General Council, the best way to do that would be for the NUM to call for a recall TUC Conference, to discuss the failure of their strategy and what to do about the sequestration. There is nothing to lose, since nothing is being done at the moment.
There needs to be a turn to the power stations by the mass pickets. Since TUC policy was seen clearly to be a fiasco, the NUM still look towards the officials to change things inside the stations. Endless, fruitless meetings go on, yet the NUM still holds back on the mass pickets and no criticism is made of the unions inside (although there are signs that a change in this may now be taking place).
The issue of other unions digging in their heels and sticking on their own claims instead of being even more ready to compromise than usual must be contiuously raised.
The Miners' strike has tended to radicalise the working class, resulting in the level of strikes (other than the miners) going up rather than down since the miners' strike began. The car industry is the strongest reflection of it since that is where exploitation has been pressed the hardest.
Austin Rover workers are now on strike and that is a very important second front. If the strike sticks, and turns into a longer struggle, it will create very important new conditions for the miners' strike. It will raise the political temperature and exacerbate the already serious economic conditions created by the miners strike. The same "viability" argument, which is the basis of the NCB case, is used by the management.
The most important connection, however, is that the Austin Rover strike violates the Tory 1984 anti-union legislation. Yet instead of confronting the laws head-on and creating a much broader second front with the miners, there are signs that at least some of the Austin Rover unions are trying to duck a confrontation with the law by refusing to call the strike official.
This week sees the end of the contract for Ford workers, and this could build substantially on the strike movement alngside the miners.
These strikes, however, cannot of themselves provide a strategic answer for the miners' strike. Pressure must come from the NUM to build on it and demand direct support — which is a qualitatively higher level of action. If this is to be the case, then the NUM must utilise the authority they have in the trade union movement, and fight to break the isolation the strike is now in.
NUM militants must fight for this kind of political turn if the consequences of the events of last week are to be reversed.
*Strike in defence of the NUM
*For a recall TUC Conference to fight the sequestration
*Call for strikes alongside the miners
*Mass pickets on the power stations
*End the compromise with the TUC right wing